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grapes sour? That is another question. The authors must be
praised, however, for making it clear to their readers that play is
not a specific sensori-motor function, but that any and all sensori-
motor functions may become acts of play.
Under " Perception" the authors discuss examples of the most
important habits, from the simplest to those which go under the
names of judgment, conviction, and belief. Under " Human
Motives " they give the student a good idea of the meaning of a
" delayed reaction" and of " volition." The chapter on " Social
Psychology" makes very clear the fact that all social habits are
accidental and not a natural part of a human being's equipment. An
" Appendix " gives a brief, but quite comprehensive account of the
" conscious " states for the benefit of those many who believe to be
unable to get along without them in psychology.
If the reviewer had not written his own textbook, which naturally
suits his own views more completely, and if then he had to select a
textbook for a beginners' course in psychology, this one of Smith
and Guthrie he would unhesitatingly select in preference to all others
on the market. Indeed, if he had to give a very abbreviated course,
he would prefer this to his own. The authors have successfully
omitted most of the " traditional, but unnecessary detail . . . and
the blind alley topics, an acquaintance with which has been considered
a polite accomplishment in psychology."
MAX F. MEYER
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI
R. S. WOODWORTH. Psychology, A Study of Mental Life. New
York: Holt, 1921. Pp. x+580.
The reviewer, whenever he sees a new psychology text, approaches
it with the following questions: (1) How does the author delimit
his field? In other words, how does he define psychology ? (2) How
does he subdivide his field ? What categories does he use for chapter
arrangement? (3) Is the author's endeavor mainly descriptive or
mainly explanatory? And if explanation plays the dominant or at
least an important role, what are the principles (laws, hypotheses) of
explanation ?
(1) Woodward separates psychology from sociology by the fol-
lowing distinction: " Sociology studies the activities of a group
of people taken as a whole, while psychology studies the activities
of the individuals." (The reviewer would prefer the distinction by
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reference to " institutional life.") He separates psychology from
biology, or more especially from physiology, by saying: " Psy-
chology devotes itself to desire, thought, memory, and such 'mental
functions/ while physiology concentrates its effort upon ' bodily'
functions." He adds that this is only a rough distinction, which
breaks down at many points. The reviewer rejects this distinction
as not being an objective one; and yet may be preferable to a certain
objective, but unreal, distinction which a certain group of psycholo-
gists is trying to popularize, holding that psychology studies "the
whole animal,"—as if a physiologist would dream of studying, for
example, the liver without reference to its service in the whole
animal. The real distinction has been emphasized perhaps first by
Miss Calkins: Everything psychological has a social significance.
" We do not find any clean separation." Therefore Woodworth
concludes that " it would be correct, then, to limit psychology to the
study of conscious activities and of activities akin to these. But
to say, as used to be said, that psychology is purely an introspective
science, making use of no other sort of observation, is absurd in
the face of the facts." So he finally adopts the following definition:
" Psychology is the science of the conscious and near-conscious ac-
tivities of living individuals." (He thus expressly excludes the souls
of the dead.) To the reviewer it appears a matter of great regret
that Woodworth in this textbook, which will undoubtedly have a
great influence on the growing generation of psychologists in this
country, did not succeed in freeing his definition from all reference
to the conscious.
(2) The author seems to have conceived his twenty chapters
(apart from the introductory) in four divisions, if the reviewer is
a good mind reader. Each of these divisions consists of a first part in
which objective facts predominate in the discussion and a second in
which introspection plays its traditional role. Into the first division
(but this is only the reviewer's impression) fall chapters II to IX.
The more objective facts are related in the chapters II to VI under
the terms " native and acquired traits, reflexes, and instincts." But in
the chapters VII to IX, " Emotion, Inventory of Human Instincts and
Primary Emotions, The Feelings " we are constantly reminded that
psychology is the science of the conscious activities. The treatment
is excellent provided we adopt the author's definition of psychology.'
And there is no doubt that the larger part of the public for aid in psy-
chology teaching still adopt that definition or a similar one.
The second division seems to consist of the chapters X, XI, XII.
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The tenth chapter discusses the functions of the sense organs on
fifty-seven pages. The subjective side then finds its dominating
treatment in chapters XI and XII under " Attention " and " Intelli-
gence." The author lays down the following six "great laws of
attention," the law of selection, the law of advantage, the law of
shifting, the law of tendency, the law of combination, the law of
degrees. All these laws, however, are treated in a descriptive rather
than in an explanatory manner,—as qualitative rather than as
quantitative and truly scientific experiences. The chapter entitled
" Intelligence " concerns itself chiefly with the Binet tests.
The third division, as the reviewer sees it, includes chapters XIII
to XVII. The thirteenth chapter " Learning and Habit Formation "
tells of the objective facts of the modifying process undergone by
native reactions. The causes which " detach a response from a
stimulus " are said to be three: " pain " or " failure " or " negative
adaptation." However true this enumeration of the causes may
appear superficially, the reviewer can not help saying, in passing,
that he does not think highly of these " causes." To one accustomed
to the explanations of the mathematicophysical sciences, those causes
are hardly an " explanation." They are a qualitative description.
The subjective side then plays its prominent role in the chapters
" Memory, Association and Mental Imagery, The Laws of Associa-
tion, Perception."
The fourth division begins with an objective statement to the effect
that " reasoning " is a kind of " exploration " of a situation. But
the statement is not analyzed either extensively or, to the reviewer,
quite convincingly enough. Is " exploration" not adopted here
because this term is so strongly " subjective" and therefore so
much more pleasing to the average reader than a more strictly ob-
jective term? The " conscious behavior " standpoint overwhelmingly
dominates the last four chapters, " Reasoning, Imagination, Will,
Personality." The nineteenth chapter, " Imagination," treats first
of " mental manipulation," but the reviewer did not succeed in under-
standing what idea of " mental manipulation " would be exactly con-
veyed by this chapter to the average reader or student. It further
treats of " play," but the reviewer did not succeed in convincing him-
self that the author attaches any definite meaning to the term " play "
in spite of the rather important role it plays in the text. The
author's intention seems to be that of using the term " play"
eclectically, so that no school of theorists can fail to find at least
some of its own views about play in the treatment offered.
SPECIAL REVIEWS 453
Maybe the reader of this review will be helped by a quotation
(p. 492) : " Play gratifies many instincts, not merely a single one.
Further, it is very doubtful whether the whole satisfaction of play
activity can be traced to the instincts, anyway, for play may bring
in the native ' likes and dislikes,' which we saw to be irreducible to
instinctive tendencies; and it may bring in acquired likes and in-
terests developed out of these native likes. Play gives rise to situa-
tions that are interesting and attractive to the players, though the
attraction cannot be traced to any of the instincts. The rhythm of
dancing, marching, and of children's sing-song games can scarcely
be traced to any of the instincts." The reviewer would certainly in
every single case trace them thus and thereby get rid of the term
" play " entirely.
The same chapter " Imagination " treats of daydreaming (" it is
a sort of play"), worry ("fear daydreams also include worry"),
nightdreaming ("it seems likely that dreams are like daydreams in
affording gratification to desires " ) , Freud's theory of dreams, autistic
thinking, invention and art. The twentieth chapter teaches (p. 528),
that " voluntary action occurs when you realize the situation and are
definitely conscious of yourself." The twenty-first chapter discusses
personality as either integrated or partially dissociated, further the
self, the unconscious and the subconscious.
(3) The book is a most excellent compilation of a mass of ma-
terial much larger than what can be taught the average student in any
single psychology course even throughout the year. But many
teachers do not mind that. The reviewer understands readily that
the average teacher will be captivated by its clear and entertaining
style,—captivated even to the extent of concluding (as at least one
psychology teacher has publicly done), that the author's treatment
has " harmonized thoroughly the rival claims of introspection and
behavior for the major part of psychology." The reviewer does
not share that rash optimism. While congratulating the author on
the very high literary merits of his book, he cannot abstrain from ex-
pressing the opinion that this book has established no such harmony
and that it is likely to have (obviously has already had) the regrettable
effect of clouding the issue, in spite of the fact that the author does
emphasize that " mental processes of all kinds are reactions " (p. 67).
It seems to the reviewer that Woodworth's text is mainly descrip-
tive, and that the explanatory features, very naturally always less
popular with the average reader or college student, have been sac-
rificed,—not absolutely, but relatively, that is, in being overshadowed
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by the descriptive features. For instance, " a reflex may come to
be attached to a new stimulus " (p. 298). " Voluntary control in-
cludes the ability to omit a response" (p. 298). "Detachment of
an impidse or emotion from its natural stimulus is very much in evi-
dence " (p. 299). " Man may observe that the dinner bell means
dinner, whereas the dog does not observe " (p. 303). " Man learns
by impulsively doing in some instances, by rational analysis in
others" (p. 313). The reviewer quotes these few examples in
order to il)ustrate his view that traditional description prevails; he
has looked in vain for " explanations " of these descriptive facts.
Perhaps it was excusable and even wise thus to place the relative
emphasis, in order to reach a larger audience. Does not even Watson,
who is regarded by many as " the" radical behaviorist, include in
his textbook a chapter on " emotions " justifiable and justified by
nothing but the fact that such a chapter has always been included in
the traditional and subjective " psychologies " ? Nevertheless, is it
not time for psychology to get out of that condition in which
(descriptive) botany and zoology found themselves forty years ago?
MAX F. MEYER
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI
JAMES SULLY. My Life and Friends: A Psychologist's Memories.
New York: Dutton (no date). Pp. 344.
G. STANLEY HALL. Recreations of a Psychologist. New York:
Appleton, 1920. Pp. 336.
MARGARET MUNSTERBERG. Hugo Munsterberg: His Life and
Work. New York: Appleton, 1922. Pp.449.
Unlike medicine and law, psychology has made little use of the
case method except in psychoanalysis. But even the orthodox psy-
chologist may at times derive profit and pleasure from a study of the
individual, particularly when that individual is himself a psychologist.
In reading the Letters of William James one is struck most of all by
the vivid picture of the author's personality. To many of the younger
generation the name of Sully, Hall, or Munsterberg represents merely
a textbook or a footnote reference. In the three volumes before us
these three pioneer psychologists are revealed as living personalities.
James Sully's Life and Friends is a chatty narrative, written in
easy, attractive style. The first part gives a life-like picture of the
author's life from childhood on. The story is told quite objectively.
In fact it is too objective at times; for we can only guess at the
